Considering whether or not a proposed investment (an intervention, technology, or program of care) is affordable is really asking whether the benefits it offers are greater than its opportunity cost. To say that an investment is cost-effective but not affordable must mean that the (implicit or explicit) "threshold" used to judge cost-effectiveness does not reflect the scale and value of the opportunity costs. Existing empirical estimates of health opportunity costs are based on crosssectional variation in expenditure and mortality outcomes by program budget categories (PBCs) and do not reflect the likely effect of nonmarginal budget impacts on health opportunity costs.
Introduction

Policy Context
In 2015, the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) completed appraisals of a number of new drugs for treating hepatitis C [1] [2] [3] . Although these drugs were approved as cost-effective by NICE for many patients, 1 NHS England (NHSE) raised serious concerns about the affordability of such a commitment, given the projected budget impact based on estimates of hepatitis C prevalence in the United Kingdom and the prices charged by the manufacturer for these drugs. As a result the implementation period of NICE guidance was extended beyond the usual timeframe [2] . Hence, there was a conflict between NICE judging these drugs to be cost-effective and NHSE regarding them unaffordable. Subsequently, NICE and NHSE have changed to the process of technology assessment to explicitly consider budget impact [5, 6] . Now, new technologies judged to be "cost-effective" by NICE but with a budget impact of over £20 million will not immediately be required to be funded by the NHS and, instead, will be subject to additional negotiation between NHSE and the manufacturer. Immediate funding will be reserved for new technologies that are more cost-effective (less than £10,000 per QALY) and with a lower budget impact. Different approaches have been taken by other institutions in other health care systems. For example, the US-based Institute for Clinical and Economic Review evaluates budget impact as a separate attribute in addition to cost-effectiveness. This is justified on the basis that short-term affordability is the main determinant of coverage decisions by private insurers in the United States [7] . Another example is Australia's Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee (PBAC); in Australia, the new hepatitis C drugs have been 1 Cost-effectiveness was judged according to the standard "cost-effectiveness threshold" applied by NICE of £20,000 to £30,000 per quality-adjusted life-year (QALY). It is worth noting that the Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee (PBAC) made judgments requiring lower cost per QALY than usual given the large budget impact [4] . judged by more stringent criteria (a lower cost per QALY "threshold") because of the scale of their likely budget impact [4] . In effect, PBAC is insisting that the maximum acceptable price for the new hepatitis C drugs should be lower because of the significance of the projected budget impact.
Considering whether or not a proposed investment (an intervention, technology, or program of care) is affordable is really asking whether the benefits it offers are greater than the value of those things that are likely to be given up if the additional costs must be accommodated within existing expenditure commitments. Alternatively, if the additional costs of the investment are to be covered through increases in health care expenditure, some assessment of the benefits that could have been gained elsewhere from the alternative use of these additional resources needs to be considered. Therefore, an assessment of health opportunity cost, based on evidence of the marginal productivity of health care expenditure, is required whether or not heath care is funded through fixed administrative budgets. The question of affordability is precisely the question that cost-effectiveness analysis seeks to inform, when the criteria for judging whether or not an intervention is cost-effective is based on an empirical assessment of the likely opportunity costs elsewhere in the health care system.
2 To say that an alternative is cost-effective but not affordable must mean that the (implicit or explicit) "threshold" used to judge cost-effectiveness does not reflect the opportunity costs incurred given the scale of the impact on health expenditure. The problem of assessing the expected health opportunity costs of a proposed investment is the same as estimating the relationship between changes in health care expenditure and health outcome. This is the approach that is taken in research conducted in the United Kingdom [14] [15] [16] , which uses national data on expenditure and outcomes in different disease areas (program budget categories [PBCs]) reported at a local level.
3 By exploiting the variation in expenditure and mortality outcomes, the relationship between changes in spending and mortality is estimated while accounting for sources of endogeneity. With additional information about age and gender of the patient population, these mortality effects can be expressed in terms of cost per life-year (£25,214 per life-year). By using the effect of expenditure on the mortality and life-year burden of disease as a surrogate for the effects on a more complete measure of health burden (one that also includes morbidity burden), the result can be expressed in terms of cost per QALY, which reflects the likely impact of expenditure at the margin on both mortality and morbidity (£12,936 per QALY) [15] . 6 The two types of PCT being considered are those that are "over target" in terms of their budget allocation and those that are "under target," where deviations of actual budget allocations from targets occurred as a result of periodic adjustments of targets based on changes in the results of a needs-based formula. Over-target PCTs received an actual allocation that was greater than their target allocation, whereas under-target PCTs were allocated less than their target allocation. The cost per life-year estimates for the big four PBCs are £10,604 for all PCTs combined; £8441 for those PCTs under their target allocation; and £14,083 for PCTs over their target allocation. The results stem from the larger magnitude of outcome elasticities in the big four PBCs when the regression models are estimated on the under-target PCTs only and smaller magnitude of outcome elasticities when estimated on the over target PCTs only. This is consistent with the concept that there are diminishing marginal returns to health care expenditure where PCTs under greater financial pressure prioritize more cost-effective treatments within PBCs compared with PCTs facing less pressure. Although the results of Claxton et al. [15] for over-and undertarget PCTs are intuitive and consistent with a health production function that exhibits diminishing marginal returns to health care expenditure, there are a number of limitations to the study: (1) Only differences in outcome elasticities between PCT subgroups are considered when differences in how a change in resources are allocated might also be expected; (2) only the four largest PBCs were included in the analysis when differences in productivity and reallocation between all 23 PBCs is possible; (3) only cost per lifeyear were reported, rather than using estimated mortality effects as a surrogate for the effects of changes in expenditure on a more complete measure of health outcome (QALYs); and (4) there was no consideration of whether estimated differences between subgroups were likely to reflect systematic differences with adequate power or merely chance variations driven by noise in the data.
This paper contributes to the literature in two main ways. First, we are able to overcome the key limitations associated with the exploration undertaken in Claxton et al. [15] by: (1) allowing expenditure and outcome elasticities to differ between the overand under-target PCTs; (2) including all PBCs in the analysis; (3) reporting the overall cost per QALY using the same methods and 2 Such an empirical assessment is described in Vallejo-Torres et al. [8] as a "supply side" assessment of opportunity costs, which is relevant [9] when the additional costs of an investment must be accommodated within existing expenditure or when health expenditure is increased to accommodate it. When non health impacts on private consumption are considered important, some assessment of the equivalent consumption value of health is required, that is, "demand side empirical research" [8] . However, some assessment of the opportunity costs of health expenditure on private consumption or "net production" is also necessary and possible [10] . Both are important but are beyond the scope of this paper (for a discussion of decision rules when there are multiple sectoral effects see Claxton et al., Claxton et al., and Drummond et al. 2015 [11-13] ).
3 A key limitation of this work is that data are collected at the level of the health authority, rather than at the level of the individual. Such data cannot be obtained at the individual level but may be available in other national settings. 4 Since the publication of Claxton et al. [17] and Claxton et al.
[15], a number of other articles have been published that discuss (footnote continued) the assumptions made in the paper: critical discussion [18, 19] , response to critique [32] , and additional sensitivity analysis [20] .
5
Large in this context should be judged relative to total expenditure and the significance of the scale of the budget impact depends on the resulting health opportunity cost. 6 Cancer, circulatory disease, respiratory problems, and gastrointestinal problems.
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